Noise-trader Risk: Does it Deter Arbitrage, and Is it Priced? by Flynn, Sean M.





Arbitrage positions that beneﬁt from the reversion of closed-end fund discounts to rational
levelsshowexcessreturnsthatincreaseinmagnitudethemorefundsaremispriced. Atthe
same time, fund trading volumes and bid-ask spreads more than double as funds become
increasingly mispriced. These behaviors suggest that non-diversiﬁable noise-trader risk
increases the more funds are mispriced and that market participants are not only aware
of this unique risk factor but demand a compensatory rate of return that varies with its
magnitude.
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As posited by Black (1986), DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), and
Campbell and Kyle (1993), noise-trader risk is the risk faced by rational traders that irrational
“noisetraders”willcauseassetpricestomoveunpredictablyandwithoutreferencetoinforma-
tion ﬂows. These authors suggest that the presence of noise traders will tend to deter rational
arbitrageurs from equalizing asset prices with fundamental values. The problem is that once
the random trading activities of noise traders have driven asset prices away from fundamental
valuations, rational arbitrageurs will be reluctant to rectify such mispricings because the on-
going, unpredictable trading activity of the noise traders leaves open the possibility that the
existing mispricings may widen rather than narrow.
A deﬁning feature of noise-trader risk is that it is an independent risk factor, uncorrelated
with either the systematic risk that drives the capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964) and
Lintner (1965), or the ﬁrm size and growth factors that also affect stock returns, as shown by
Fama and French (1992). But identifying the independent effect of this risk factor is difﬁcult
when studying the returns of typical stock issues because the noise-trader volatility that would
deter arbitrage would tend to look much like the noisiness caused by a wide variety of other
factors. Even more problematic is the fact that because of reasonable differences in interpret-
ing fundamentals and making forecasts, it is not normally possible to make a convincing case
that the typical operating company’s stock is at any particular moment mispriced. Since you
cannot demonstrate mispricing, it is hard to make an empirical case that noise-trader risk is
deterring the arbitrage necessary to rectify mispricings.
Closed-end funds can be used to solve both of these problems. First, because their funda-
mental values are easily calculated, you can convincingly demonstrate that their market prices
often differ from their fundamental values. That of course opens up the possibility that noise-
trader risk is deterring the arbitrage activities what would be necessary to equalize their prices
1withtheirfundamentals. Second, itispossibletoisolatetheeffectsofnoise-traderriskbecause
it appears to vary systematically with the degree to which closed-end funds are mispriced.
The reason it is possible to demonstrate that closed-end funds are mispriced is because
their fundamental values can be precisely calculated at frequent intervals. Closed-end funds
are simply mutual funds that do not redeem their own shares. Instead, their shares trade
on large stock exchanges where their prices are determined by supply and demand. At the
same time, they voluntarily release on a weekly basis their net asset values (NAVs), which are
simply the values of their assets minus their liabilities. As a result, one would expect that an
informationally efﬁcient market would set the market value of each fund equal to its NAV, or
perhaps to its NAV less the discounted value of expected future management fees.
But such is not the case. Closed-end funds routinely trade at prices that differ signiﬁcantly
from their NAVs or from valuations consistent with discounting out future fund expenses. A
natural result of this phenomenon has been a large literature devoted to understanding why
funds trade at discounts and premia relative to their portfolio values, as well as whether ar-
bitrage pressures are strong enough to keep closed-end fund share prices at least reasonably
linked to portfolio values, management fees, and the standard risk factors (see Dimson and
Minio-Kozerski 1999b for an excellent survey.)
But perhaps the strangest thing about the mispricings found in closed-end funds is that
they happen despite the absence of any obvious arbitrage barriers and in the presence of very
active arbitrage. For instance, large and very liquid funds often trade at large discounts for
months or years at a time despite the fact that arbitrage would only involve purchasing fund
shares—something that is easily done. At the same time, there is direct evidence of very active
arbitrage activities being undertaken against overpriced funds. Indeed, Flynn (2004) shows
that there is very intense short selling of NYSE-traded closed-end funds selling at premia and
2that the intensity of short selling increases the more funds are overpriced relative to their net
asset values.
Consequently, while it is clear that arbitrageurs do respond to fund mispricings, it is also
clear that the amount of arbitrage in which they engage is not large enough to overcome
the large and lingering mispricings routinely observed in closed-end funds. Since there are no
obvious barriers to arbitrage—especially for funds trading at discounts, where arbitrage would
merely involve buying fund shares—it appears that arbitrageurs must be voluntarily limiting
the amount of arbitrage capital that they invest in closed-end funds. This paper makes the case
that their self-restraint is due to the deterrent effect of noise-trader risk.
The major evidence in favor of this conclusion comes from examining a cross-section of
closed-end fund arbitrage portfolios. The cross section is based on fund discount and premium
levels, so that twenty portfolios are created to examine the returns that an arbitrageur would
get for arbitrage positions targeting various levels of under- or over-pricing. In addition, each
of these mock portfolios goes long the shares of the fund while shorting the fund’s underlying
portfolio. This is crucial methodological innovation because it serves to isolate the returns that
derive solely from the mean reversion of fund share prices towards net asset values. By doing
so, we can see if such returns can be accounted for by the standard Fama and French (1992)
risk factors. As it turns out, they cannot.
Rather, the portfolios produce a striking pattern of excess returns. Excess returns are near
zero for portfolios containing funds trading at prices near rational levels, but grow rapidly in
magnitude the more funds are mispriced. For instance, the portfolio that invests only in funds
trading at discounts of between zero and ﬁve percent generates a statistically insigniﬁcant
excess return of -0.15 percent per month while the portfolio that invests in funds trading at
discounts of between twenty-ﬁve and thirty percent generates a highly statistically signiﬁcant
excess return of 2.12% per month.
3This pattern suggests very clearly that if you account for only the standard risk factors,
arbitrageurs have a strong incentive to engage in arbitrage against mispriced closed-end funds,
and that the incentive increases the more funds are mispriced. What then is preventing them
from capturing these excess returns? I believe that the answer is noise-trader risk. It deters
arbitrageurs from investing the full amount of arbitrage capital that would be necessary to
immediately rectify closed-end fund mispricings. But since it is not accounted for by the
standard risk factors, there appear to be excess returns when in fact what is happening is that
the apparent excess returns serve to compensate rational arbitrageurs for bearing noise-trader
risk.
There are several pieces of evidence that support this contention. First, you can show that
fund-speciﬁc noise-trader risk is the likely culprit because the excess returns remain even after
adding ﬁrst-differences of average discount and premium levels as an additional explanatory
variable. Since these ﬁrst differences capture the returns that result from any sort of discount
volatility common to closed-end funds as a group, their inclusion makes it much more likely
that any remaining volatility is the result of a fund-speciﬁc risk factor—and that the observed
excess returns are compensation for being exposed to this fund-speciﬁc risk factor.
In addition, there is an inverse relationship between R-squared statistics and excess returns
across the various arbitrage portfolios that also strongly suggests that fund-speciﬁc noise-
trader risk (rather than something common to all funds) may be the hidden risk factor by
which the excess returns may be explained. For the portfolios consisting of funds trading
near rational levels, R-squared statistics are very high while excess returns are near zero. But
for portfolios increasingly far from fundamental levels, you see R-squared statistics sharply
decrease while excess returns increase. Since the regressions account for both the standard
factors as well as movements in discount and premium levels common to all funds, a natural
interpretation of this inverse relationship is that the excess returns to arbitrage grow as you
4move farther away from fundamental discount levels in order to provide compensation for
a missing risk factor that also grows as you move farther away from fundamental discount
levels.
I conclude the paper with two additional pieces of evidence consistent with fund-speciﬁc
noise-trader risk increasing as you move farther away from fundamental discount levels. The
ﬁrst is that the average ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding is U-shaped if you plot it
against discount and premium levels, with the ratio nearly doubling as you move away from
fundamental discount levels to either large discounts or large premia. This pattern jibes with
the theoretical models of Varian (1989), Kandel and Pearson (1995), and Harris and Raviv
(1993), which link increased divergence of opinion among traders (due, I argue, to increased
activity by noise traders) with higher trading volumes.
The second is that the average ratio of the bid-ask spread to the ask price, (bid – ask)/ask,
is also U-shaped if you plot it against discount and premium levels. Since closed-end funds
do not pose any obvious informational asymmetries (because portfolio values are public), it
seems very likely that spreads widen as you move away from fundamental discount levels
because specialists are reacting to increasingly high price volatility caused by increasingly ac-
tive noise traders. This behavior on the part of specialists would be consistent with the models
of Garbade and Silber (1979) and Ho and Stoll (1981), where increasing price volatility by
itself causes risk-averse market makers to widen spreads even in the absence of informational
differences between specialists and traders.
Section 2 describes the data and deﬁnes discounts and premia. Section 3 examines the
cross section of closed-end fund arbitrage returns and how closed-end fund trading volume
and bid-ask spreads vary with discount and premium levels. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and Deﬁnitions
5In June of 2001, I purchased a subscription to the Fund Edge data set sold by Weisen-
berger/Thompson Financial. Fund Edge is used primarily by analysts for its real-time stream-
ing data on fund portfolio values and share prices, which can be utilized to compute the dis-
count or premium at which closed-end funds trade. Fund Edge also contains historical time
series of fund prices, net asset values, dividend payments, and other variables.
However, the way the data is sold, a subscriber only receives historical data for the funds
currently in existence at the time of subscription. Consequently, my data set only contains
historical time series on the 462 closed-end funds trading in the United States and Canada in
June of 2001. This implies, of course, that the data set suffers from survival bias. However,
because this paper is interested in the behavior of returns under the normal situation in which
a fund is expected to continue operating indeﬁnitely, the survival bias in the data set actually
works as a nice ﬁlter. Those funds that went through the abnormal process of being liquidated
or converted into open-end funds have been eliminated.1 Of the 462 funds, three hundred
eighty nine were listed on the NYSE, sixty one on the AMEX, seven on the NASDAQ, four
on the Toronto Exchange, and one—the NAIC Growth Fund—on the Mid-west Exchange.
It should be noted that this data set is much larger and more comprehensive than any other
closed-end fund data set previously examined in the literature.
Below, I concentrate on the Fund Edge data covering 1985-2001 for two reasons. First,
some of the time series of older funds are incomplete prior to 1985. Second, there was a huge
increase in the number of funds starting in the late 1980s.2 As a result, the overwhelming
majority of the data lies in the post-1985 period anyway.
1Whatever expectation the market has about funds liquidating or converting to open-end formats should be
incorporated into the returns of the remaining funds, so that excluding the funds that did actually liquidate or
convert should not bias the results below.
2Fewer than 30 funds were listed in the Wall Street Journal in 1985.
















































































































































































































































































































t Nt be the net asset value
(NAV) per share of a fund at time t. The NAV of a fund is simply its portfolio value less any
liabilities the fund may have; it is the value that would be distributed to shareholders were the
fund to liquidate immediately. Let Pt be the fund’s price per share at time t. The discount or
premium at which a fund trades at time t is deﬁned as Dt = Nt=Pt ¡1. Values of Dt > 0 are
called discounts, while values of Dt <0 are referred to as premia. In this paper, I will multiply
Dt by 100 and refer to discounts and premia in percentages.
7YoucangetagoodsummaryofthediscountandpremiadatabyexaminingFigure1, which
plots a relative frequency histogram of the 227,066 weekly Dt observations on the 462 funds
found in Fund Edge over the period January 1985 through May 2001. The ﬁgure excludes
761 outliers, most of which are in the left (premium) tail since the distribution is skewed
towards premia. (The most extreme discount was 66.5% while the most extreme premium
was -205.4%.)
The data is bell shaped and centered on a discount of about 6%, consistent with Ross
(2002) and Flynn (2002), who argue that funds should rationally trade at discounts of about
7% in order to capitalize out future fund expenses. This means that, on average, fund Dt values
are consistent with the markets acting to rationally equate share prices with fundamentals.
What this paper addresses, however, is the spread of the distribution and in particular why
Dt values of individual funds often deviate wildly from rational levels. If arbitrageurs can get
prices right on average, why can’t they get them right more quickly? If they could, deviations
from rational prices would be short lived and the distribution of Dt values in Figure 1 wouldn’t
show such a wide spread.
3. Closed-end Fund Arbitrage Returns
Black (1986) divides market participants into two groups, information traders and noise
traders. Information traders make trades based on the latest information about future asset
returns. By contrast, noise traders react to noise—signals that contain no new information
relevant to assessing future asset returns. For instance, noise traders may falsely extrapolate
past trends. They may also be subject to hunches or may incorrectly believe that they have
special information as in the model of noise-trader risk applied to closed-end funds by De-
Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990). However, the particular reason that causes
8them to engage in non-information based trading is not important. The only thing that matters
for asset pricing is that their trading behavior be unpredictable.
That’s because if their actions are unpredictable, then they will present a unique and in-
dependent source of risk to rational information traders, as in Campbell and Kyle (1993). In
particular, if the price volatility caused by the noise traders is not correlated with the returns
on other assets, it will be unhedgeable. As such, this risk (which I refer to as noise-trader
risk) will affect asset prices by tending to discourage rational traders from correcting mis-
pricings: while mispricings offer obvious proﬁt opportunities, they will not be riskless proﬁt
opportunities because noise traders may cause mispricings to widen rather than narrow.
Since modern ﬁnance theory is based on the idea that all returns in excess of the risk-
free rate must be compensation for some form of risk or another, noise-trader risk also has
implications for regressions run to test for excess returns. Consider an asset that is affected
by noise-trader risk and in which a portion of overall returns is, in fact, a compensation for
noise-trader risk. If variables that can capture the effect of noise-trader risk on returns are left
out of factor regressions, then you may be misled into believing that there are excess returns
when all that is really happening is that you have missed a risk factor.
Now, of course, any regression is apt to turn up excess returns—and it would be foolish to
immediately ascribe such excess returns to noise-trader risk. That being said, my strategy in
what follows is to cross section the closed-end funds in the data set into portfolios and then
look at the excess returns to those portfolios to see if they have any pattern that can reasonably
be ascribed to differences in exposure to noise-trader risk. I ﬁnd that such a pattern emerges if
you simply sort funds by their discount and premium levels before running factor regressions.
9But before presenting those results on risk-adjusted returns, I will ﬁrst show you the non-
risk-adjusted returns available to arbitrageurs in closed-end funds. Seeing them helps to put
the excess returns after risk adjustment into better perspective.
3.1. Non-Risk-Adjusted Arbitrage Returns
Arbitrageurs hoping to beneﬁt from closed-end fund mispricings will set up positions that
will beneﬁt if fund prices move toward fundamentals. For funds trading at large discounts,
they will go long the shares of the fund and short its underlying, as any reduction in the
discount would generate a proﬁt. And for funds trading at large premia, they will go long the
underlying and short the fund’s shares, as any reduction in premia would generate a proﬁt. By
hedging long positions in fund shares with short positions in fund portfolios (or vice versa),
arbitrageurs can isolate the returns that come solely from the mean reversion of discounts and
premiums, that is from the dissipation of mispricings over time.3 In what follows, however, I
will for simplicity only look at the returns to going long the shares of a fund while shorting
its underlying. The returns to the opposite position (shorting the fund while going long the
underlying) are of course just the negative of these returns.
The returns are driven by the tendency of discounts and premia to mean revert. It turns
out that they revert to the mode of the discount and premium distribution shown in Figure 1
and that they do so following an AR(1) process.4 This is convenient because, by estimating
the AR(1) process, you can get estimates not only for the level to which discounts and premia
mean revert, but of the pace of mean reversion as well.
3You can see this by rearranging the identity that deﬁnes Dt based on NAV and price: Nt = (1+Dt)Pt, for




Nt ) = ¡log(
1+Dt+1
1+Dt ). This
means that the rate of return to going long the shares of the fund while shorting the underlying is equal to the
negative of the rate of change of 1+Dt.
4I tested many processes. AR(1) is best, by far.
10To see how this works, assume that the discount or premium, Dt, is mean reverting to
the level ¯ D. Under an AR(1) process, Dt+1 = ¯ D+f(Dt ¡ ¯ D)+et, where f gives the fraction
of the month t deviation that remains the next month and et is a Gaussian shock. We can
get empirical estimates for f and ¯ D by re-arranging the algebra on the right-hand side of the
equation and running a regression on Dt+1 = constant +fDt +et. Our estimated constant
will be equal to (1¡f) ¯ D, which will allow us to back out the value of ¯ D after estimating the
equation.
Using monthly discount and premium data for the 462 closed-end funds in the data set,
and estimating the equation using pooled least squares on data covering 1985-2001 gives a
constant of 0.44 and an estimated value for f of 0.916. The regression has an R2 statistic
of 0.84 and the t-statistics on the constant and f are, respectively, 12.0 and 162.7. Using
these estimates, we can back out an estimated value for ¯ D of 5.2%. That is, this regression
methodology indicates that discounts and premia revert to the same level as the mode discount
of Figure 1.
In addition, the estimate for f indicates that, on average, 91.6% of the deviation between
a current Dt value and the long-run mean-reverting value of 5.2% will remain the following
month—meaning that about 8.4% of any such gap will be closed, on average. Consequently,
the magnitude of the return available to arbitrageurs in any speciﬁc case depends on how far
away from the mean-reverting discount level the current discount or premium is—reverting
8.4% of a big gap implies a much bigger return than does reverting 8.4% of a small gap.
To see how this rate of mean reversion affects returns, it is fruitful to plot the monthly
returns of both fund shares and fund NAVs against discount and premium levels. I do this
in Figure 2 by aggregating all of my monthly data and sorting observations by discount or
premium without regard to each observation’s date. Speciﬁcally, I take each of the 52,188
monthly discount or premium observations running from January 1985 to April 2001 and
11Figure 2. Average one-month share and NAV returns when sorting each observation by its




















place them into one-percent wide bins running from a premium of -50% to a discount of 50%.
For all of the observations in a given bin, I then separately calculate the return over the next
month to holding a long position in the associated fund’s shares as well as the return over the
next month to holding a long position in the fund’s underlying NAV, being sure to properly
account for dividend payments. I call the former share returns and the later NAV returns and
plot their respective bin averages in Figure 2.
As you can see, NAV returns are a basically a horizontal line at about one percent per
month, meaning that they are unrelated to discount and premium levels. 5 On the other hand,
5This is consistent with Malkiel (1977), Pontiff (1995), and Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999) who ﬁnd that
discount and premium levels are unrelated to future NAV performance. However, Fund Edge contains mostly
bond funds (since they are much more numerous than stock funds) and this must be noted because Chay and
Trzcinka (1999) found that discount and premium levels were signiﬁcantly related to future NAV performance
for stock funds, but not for bond funds.
12share returns are positively related to Dt levels. This is because of mean reversion. For in-
stance, as fund prices move back towards the center of the distribution in Figure 1, share
returns will exceed NAV returns for funds trading at Dt > ¯ D because of capital gains caused
by the mean reversion of prices upward toward NAVs. Contrariwise, capital losses will accrue
to funds trading at Dt < ¯ D as mean reversion causes prices to fall downward toward NAVs.
The difference between share returns and NAV returns is important because it serves to
attract arbitrageurs to closed-end funds (and, under this paper’s working hypothesis, to com-
pensate them for noise-trader risk.) The magnitude of that attraction is best seen by looking
at the how the difference between share and NAV returns is distributed across Dt levels. I
do this by again placing each of the 52,188 monthly discount and premium observations into
one-percent wide bins running from a premium of -50% to a discount of 50%. But this time,
instead of averaging the share and NAV returns separately, I take their difference for all ob-
servations in each bin and then calculate each bin’s average and standard deviation of those
differences. These are plotted separately in Figure 3.
The average difference between share price and NAV returns by bin (the thicker line in
Figure 3) is of course equal to the vertical difference between the share return and NAV return
lines in Figure 2. It is upward sloping and linear in the center of the ﬁgure where there are
a substantial number of observations in each bin, reinforcing the fact that arbitrage returns
clearly depend on discount and premium levels. Its high volatility at both ends of the graph
is due to there being very few observations in the outlying bins. For instance, the big spikes
on the right side of the ﬁgure are for bins containing fewer than six and sometimes just one
observation. The mode bin, by contrast, contains 2,308 observations.
Very importantly, the standard deviation increases the further you move away from the
mean-revertingdiscountlevel. Thismeansthatwhilethereturnstoarbitragepositionsincrease
thefurtheryoumoveawayfromthemeanrevertinglevel, sodoestheamountofriskassociated
13Figure 3. Average one-month share less NAV returns and standard deviations when sorting




















with such positions. This is, of course, consistent with the intuitions of modern ﬁnance theory,
and the question that will be explored in the next section is whether the risk associated with
arbitrage in closed-end funds can be explained by standard risk factors.
But before addressing that issue, it is interesting to plot out reward-to-risk ratios against
discount and premium levels. I do this in Figure 4 by dividing each bin’s average share less
NAV return by the bin’s standard deviation of those returns—that is, I divide the values given
by the thick line in Figure 3 by those given by the thin line in Figure 3.
The result in Figure 4 is very striking. It shows that for all the bins in the center of the
discount and premium distribution, there is a clear linear relationship between discount and
premium levels and the reward-to-risk ratio. This is true all the way from a -10% premium
14Figure 4. Ratio of average one-month share less NAV returns to the standard deviation of













Discounts (Premia) in Percentages
to a 30% discount and it suggests that closed-end fund markets have some systematic method
of pricing the risk associated with holding closed-end fund arbitrage positions. In addition, it
suggests quite clearly that there are discount and premium levels for which arbitrage many not
be worth undertaking. In particular, if the volatility inherent in the reward-to-risk ratios plotted
in Figure 4 cannot be accounted for by the standard risk factors and is indeed a unique form
of risk, then the reward-to-risk ratios near the center of the discount and premium distribution
are too low to warrant arbitrage activity. Only as you move into the tails of the distribution
will reward-to-risk ratios be high enough to justify investing substantial capital into arbitrage
activities. Consequently, Figure 4 tells a very clear story about how mispricings can persist in
closed-end funds given the deterrent effects of noise-trader risk.
3.2. The Cross Section of Risk-Adjusted Arbitrage Returns
15In this section, I examine the risk-adjusted proﬁtability of arbitrage in closed-end funds
and the effects of noise-trader risk on arbitrage returns by cross sectioning closed-end fund
arbitrage returns by discount and premium levels. I do this by constructing twenty portfolios
set up to isolate the proﬁts that can be achieved by arbitraging against the mean reversion
of discounts and premia.These portfolios are constructed using monthly data ranging from
July 1985 through May 2001 and each portfolio corresponds to a ﬁve percentage-point wide
discount or premium bin.6 The ﬁrst bin corresponds to premia falling between -50% and -
45%. The twentieth bin corresponds to discounts falling between 45% and 50%. For each
month, funds were placed into the bins based upon their Dt levels that month. For instance,
all of the funds with discounts between 10% and 15% in a given month were placed into the
thirteenth bin.
For each fund in a given bin, the returns over the following month to its spot share price
and to its NAV were calculated. These returns take account of dividend payments and are
denotedrshare andrNAV, respectively.7 Excessreturnsoverthefollowingmonthtothearbitrage
portfolio that goes long fund shares and short the underlying, rshare¡rNAV, were then averaged
with those of all other funds in the bin to get that bin’s monthly portfolio return. By doing this
for all funds in each bin each month, I generated twenty time series that form a cross section
of the returns available to arbitragers of US and Canadian funds over the period 1985 to 2001.
Please note that this methodology of going long the fund while shorting the NAV in order
to isolate the returns to arbitrage in closed-end funds is an innovation. Previous authors be-
6January through June 1985 can be included without affecting the results. I left them out because I eliminated
the ﬁrst six months of data on all funds (including, as overkill, those in existence in January 1985) in order to
avoid any of the predictable mean reversion that happens after funds have their IPOs. Weiss (1989) and Peavy
(1990) both ﬁnd that closed-end funds begin trading immediately after their IPOs at premia of about eight to ten
percent in order to pay investment bankers. But these typically turn to discounts within a few months after an
IPO.
7The NAV returns also properly account for the reductions in NAV caused by fund expenses and management
fees. Thus, you do not have to worry about NAV returns being overstated as they would be if such costs were not
taken into account.
16ginning with Thompson (1978) and including Anderson (1986) and Pontiff (1995) run CAMP
and Fama-French three-factor regressions on long positions in closed-end funds. These au-
thors ﬁnd excess returns but because the returns to long positions are affected by both changes
in fund NAVs as well as changes in fund Dt levels relative to NAVs, it is not possible to iso-
late the returns available to arbitrageurs attempting to beneﬁt from the reversion of mispriced
funds towards rational valuations. By going long fund shares while going short their NAVs,
the portfolios examined here make such an isolation possible. This is important because isola-
tion allows you to properly examine whether the standard risk factors can explain the returns
to arbitraging mispriced funds.
The twenty time series that isolate arbitrage returns are used as the independent variables
in the Fama-French (1992) regressions shown in Table 1. Each time series was regressed on a
constant, a, and the three Fama and French (1992) factors: rm¡rf is the market excess return,
SMB is the return to small capitalization stocks less the return to large capitalization stocks,
and HML is the return to value stocks less the return to growth stocks. All variables are given
in percents.
Fama and French (1992) famously argue that their three factors can explain returns to long
positions in stocks. But as you can see from the cross-section of closed-end fund arbitrage
returns in Table 1, these three factors do a poor job of explaining the returns available to ar-
bitrageurs in closed-end funds. This is obvious by looking at the third column of the table,
which gives the excess returns to each portfolio. With the exception of the zero to ﬁve per-
cent discount bin and a couple of the most extreme bins, the excess returns are all robustly
signiﬁcant, indicating that the standard risk factors are not accounting for all of the risk facing
closed-end fund arbitrage positions. This, of course, suggests that there may be a missing risk
factor.
17Table 1
Fama French Regressions on Closed-end Fund Arbitrage Portfolios Deﬁned by
Discount Levels
This table reports the results of Fama and French (1992) three-factor regressions performed on 20 arbitrage
portfolios whose returns depend entirely on changes in discount and premium levels. The regressions are run on
monthly data covering July 1985 to May 2001. The 20 portfolios are deﬁned by discount and premium levels,
so that each month each fund is placed into one of 20 ﬁve-percentage point wide bins, the bins ranging from
a premium of -50% to a discount of 50%. For each fund in a given bin, I take the difference between share
returns and NAV returns, rshare¡rNAV, since this difference isolates the return that derives solely from changes in
discount and premium levels. I then average all the differences in each bin each month. Doing so provides twenty
time series that together generate a cross section of the returns to arbitrage in closed-end funds. These returns
are then regressed in the normal way on a constant, a, and the three Fama and French (1992) factors: rm¡rf is
the market excess return, SMB is the return to small capitalization stocks less the return to large capitalization
stocks, and HML is the return to value stocks less the return to growth stocks. Standard errors are calculated
using the method of Newey and West (1987) and t-statistics are given in parentheses. These are OLS regressions.
All variables are deﬁned in percents.
Bin Bin Average Std. Dev.
Lower Upper Dependant Dependant
Bound Bound a rm¡rf SMB HML R-sq Variable Variable Obs.
-50 -45 -3.36 0.69 1.11 0.77 0.25 -3.59 8.26 17
(-1.88) (1.79) (1.05) (0.69)
-45 -40 -5.58 0.61 -0.15 -0.11 0.11 -4.95 8.09 42
(-3.75) (1.47) (-0.26) (-0.23)
-40 -35 -2.57 -0.15 0.29 0.34 0.03 -2.59 8.92 45
(-1.92) (-0.55) (0.42) (0.71)
-35 -30 -4.19 -0.08 0.18 0.28 0.02 -4.06 8.08 65
(-4.19) (-0.45) (0.64) (1.21)
-30 -25 -3.41 0.25 0.81 0.60 0.14 -2.99 7.90 77
(-3.68) (1.27) (2.13) (1.67)
-25 -20 -1.88 0.44 0.20 0.17 0.05 -1.51 8.01 100
(-2.39) (2.34) (0.94) (0.72)
-20 -15 -1.29 0.43 0.19 0.36 0.11 -0.93 5.67 138
(-3.69) (2.86) (1.79) (2.58)
-15 -10 -1.19 0.13 0.01 0.14 0.06 -1.10 2.53 170
(-6.13) (3.30) (0.16) (2.48)
-10 -5 -0.92 0.13 0.07 0.23 0.18 -0.82 1.88 178
(-6.62) (4.13) (1.39) (3.80)
-5 0 -0.43 0.07 0.10 0.18 0.13 -0.39 1.60 179
(-4.13) (2.50) (2.18) (3.83)
0 5 -0.15 0.10 0.08 0.17 0.16 -0.08 1.51 179
(-1.54) (3.51) (1.65) (3.70)
5 10 0.27 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.32 1.70 179
(2.35) (1.92) (2.34) (3.18)
10 15 0.65 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.72 1.98 175
(4.40) (2.41) (3.13) (3.86)
15 20 0.84 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.93 2.65 164
(3.96) (2.17) (2.58) (2.73)
20 25 1.83 0.20 0.04 0.14 0.06 1.98 3.54 147
(6.23) (1.73) (0.42) (1.98)
25 30 2.12 0.49 0.10 0.21 0.11 2.60 5.92 99
(4.07) (3.02) (0.71) (2.52)
30 35 2.83 0.57 -0.10 0.10 0.11 3.47 7.18 56
(3.05) (3.02) (-0.47) (0.94)
35 40 1.32 0.87 0.34 0.38 0.42 1.56 4.72 23
(1.61) (4.95) (1.11) (1.60)
40 45 8.23 0.91 -0.98 0.04 0.43 6.28 6.88 9
(2.55) (2.11) (-1.57) (0.62)
45 50 Insufﬁcient Observations
18What is more, the excess returns vary radically from one end of the cross section to the
other. They are large, negative, and very signiﬁcant for the extreme premium bins at the top of
the column, fall towards zero as you move near the mean-reverting discount level of six per-
cent, and then grow into large, positive, and highly signiﬁcant values as you continue moving
down the table into bins containing larger and larger discounts. This pattern strongly sug-
gests that the portfolios are exposed to varying levels of the missing risk factor. In particular,
they are consistent with larger exposure for portfolios farther away from the mean-reverting
discount level.
Belief in this possibility is reinforced by looking at the numbers in the ninth column, which
give the standard deviations over time of each portfolio’s dependent variable, rshare ¡rNAV.
These standard deviations are smallest for the portfolios near the mean-reverting discount
level, and grow much larger as you move to either deep discounts or large premia. Since
the dependent variables are returns to arbitrage portfolios, this is clear evidence that the level
of risk associated with attempting to proﬁt from the mean reversion of discounts and premia
increases the farther you move away from the mean-reverting discount level.8 difference be-
tween share and NAV returns The Fama-French factors fail to account for this risk pattern
across portfolios.
Finally, the pattern found in the R-squared statistics as you look across the twenty portfo-
lios also suggests that the Fama-French factors explain very little of the time variation within
any given portfolio. With the exception of a few portfolios that have very few observations
because they are in the tails of the discount and premium distribution, R-squared statistics are
8In an earlier paper entitled,“Equilibrium Arbitrage in the Presence of Noise-trader Risk: Evidence from
Closed-end Funds” I made the error of subtracting off the risk-free interest rate from the dependent variable in
the regressions reported in Table 1. That is, I used rshare ¡rNAV ¡rf as the dependent variable, where rr is the
risk free interest rate. Subtracting the risk-free rate incorrectly introduced a bias in the estimated alphas, making
it incorrectly appear that no excess returns were available on closed-end fund arbitrage positions for most of
the bins. Subtracting off the risk-free rate, though, is incorrect since these long/short arbitrage positions are
self-ﬁnancing. The correct alphas, reported in Table 1, are in fact signiﬁcantly different from zero for nearly all
bins.
19modest. The highest R-squared statistics of 0.18 and 0.16 happen for funds near the long-
run mean-reverting discount level. As you move away from this level in either direction,
the R-squared statistics fall (with the exception already noted of the extreme bins with very
few observations). This pattern suggests that the modest explanatory power possessed by the
Fama-French factors is concentrated near the center of the discount and premium distribution.
As you move into the tails of the distribution, the three Fama-French factors do an increasingly
poor job of explaining the time variation of the returns within each of the various portfolios.
3.2.1. Accounting for Volatility that Affects all Funds Simultaneously
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) ﬁnd that discount and premium levels across US closed-
end funds from 1965 to 1985 are highly correlated. This is also true for the Fund Edge data
from 1985 to 2001 that is used here. Consequently, it is important to see if the cross-sectional
pattern of excess returns found in Table 1 is robust to accounting for changes in fund discount
and premium levels that affect all funds simultaneously.
Table 2 regresses a constant and the monthly change in the capital-weighted average dis-
count level across all funds on the twenty arbitrage portfolio return series used in Table 1.
More speciﬁcally, the capital-weighted average discount, Wt, was calculated for all funds in
existence each month by combining Fund Edge data on Dt values and NAVs with CRSP
data on shares outstanding. The independent variable in each regression in Table 2 is sim-
ply this variable’s ﬁrst difference, DWt = Wt ¡Wt¡1. This lag structure matches the timing
used to sort funds into portfolios. The return on each arbitrage portfolio during month t is
the result of sorting funds into the twenty portfolios based on their discounts at the end of
month t ¡1. In a similar way, DWt = Wt ¡Wt¡1 gives the change in the average discount
level from the end of month t ¡1 to the end of month t. Hence, by running the regression
rshare ¡rNAV = constant +DWt +et for each portfolio, you can see how the common factor
that causes discounts and premiums to be correlated affects the returns to arbitrage positions.
20Table 2
Regressions of Changes in the Monthly Capital Weighted Average Discount or
Premium Level on the Returns to Closed-end Fund Arbitrage Portfolios Deﬁned by
Discount Levels
This table reports the results of regressing a constant and the change in the capital-weighted average discount
level across all funds each month on the twenty closed-end fund arbitrage portfolios used in Table 1. That is, if
Wt is the capital-weighted average discount across all funds in a given month t, then the independent variable in
this regression is, DWt =Wt ¡Wt¡1. This timing convention for DWt is consistent with that used for the dependent
variable since the return on the arbitrage portfolios during month t, rshare
t ¡rNAV
t , is the result of sorting the funds
into the twenty portfolios based on their discounts at the end of month t ¡1. Hence, for each portfolio, the
regression is rshare
t ¡rNAV
t = constant +DWt +et, where et is the error term. Standard errors are calculated using
the method of Newey and West (1987) and t-statistics are given in parentheses. These are OLS regressions. All
variables are deﬁned in percents.
Bin Bin Average Std. Dev.
Lower Upper Dependant Dependant
Bound Bound Constant DWt R-sq Dep. Variable Variable Obs.
-50 -45 -2.68 1.99 0.12 -3.93 8.41 16
(-1.62) (1.29)
-45 -40 -4.49 1.51 0.04 -4.95 8.09 42
(-3.66) (0.97)
-40 -35 -2.73 -0.09 0.00 -2.74 8.97 44
(-1.85) (-0.09)
-35 -30 -4.03 0.32 0.00 -4.06 8.08 65
(-4.10) (0.51)
-30 -25 -2.89 1.92 0.12 -3.18 7.78 76
(-2.70) (1.84)
-25 -20 -1.32 1.36 0.05 -1.51 8.01 100
(-1.57) (2.53)
-20 -15 -0.88 0.33 0.01 -0.93 5.67 138
(-2.20) (0.54)
-15 -10 -1.02 0.95 0.28 -1.10 2.53 170
(-5.29) (5.09)
-10 -5 -0.77 0.79 0.34 -0.82 1.89 177
(-5.15) (8.30)
-5 0 -0.33 0.89 0.59 -0.39 1.60 178
(-4.12) (10.88)
0 5 -0.02 0.83 0.57 -0.08 1.52 178
(-0.32) (10.60)
5 10 0.36 0.92 0.56 0.30 1.70 178
(3.91) (11.29)
10 15 0.77 0.80 0.32 0.74 1.97 174
(5.45) (6.75)
15 20 0.95 0.93 0.23 0.93 2.65 164
(5.07) (6.92)
20 25 1.94 0.59 0.05 1.98 3.54 147
(7.48) (2.23)
25 30 2.55 0.98 0.05 2.60 5.92 99
(4.51) (1.66)
30 35 3.20 1.07 0.05 3.47 7.18 56
(3.48) (1.96)
35 40 1.51 0.35 0.02 1.56 4.72 23
(1.54) (0.69)
40 45 6.10 0.17 0.00 6.28 6.88 9
(1.76) (0.14)
45 50 Insufﬁcient Observations
21The results of running these regressions are very striking. First of all, look at the R-
squared statistics in the ﬁfth column. They are much higher than those generated by the
Fama-French factors in Table 1. In particular, the R-squared statistic for the zero percent to
ﬁve percent discount bin (row 11 of the table) is an extremely high 0.59, much higher than the
0.16 achieved when regressing the Fama-French factors on that portfolio’s return series.
But the pattern of R-squared statistics in cross-section is even more interesting. As you
move away from the mean-reverting discount level in either direction, the explanatory power
of changes in the cross-sectional average discount level falls to zero very quickly and stays
near zero except for the ﬁrst two bins which have very few observations. This means that while
changes in discount levels have great explanatory power for funds trading near the center of
the distribution in Figure 1, they have no explanatory power for funds trading in the tails of the
distribution. This suggests that the returns to funds in the tails of the distribution are subject to
fund-speciﬁc risk factors (i.e. fund-speciﬁc noise-trader risk) that are independent of whatever
common risk factors cause closed-end fund discounts and premia to move in unison.
ThisisanimportantpointbecauseIwouldliketodistinguishclearlybetweenfund-speciﬁc
risk factors and the argument about small investor sentiment made by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler
(1991). Under their hypothesis, average discount and premium levels across funds are cor-
related because they are a measure of small-investor sentiment. They suggest that larger dis-
counts happen when sentiment turns negative and people are willing to pay less for closed-end
fund shares. Similarly, they argue that smaller discounts (and premiums) reﬂect positive sen-
timent which bids up fund share prices relative to NAVs.9 In addition, they argue that these
movements in small investor sentiment may be a priced risk factor for assets in general.
9This hypothesis requires the assumption of segmented markets. The authors assume that small (irrational)
investors dominate the closed-end fund markets while large (rational) investors dominate the markets for the
securities in which closed-end fund invest. As a result, when small investor sentiment changes, it changes
fund share prices without affecting fund NAVs. Consequently, discounts and premia vary with small investor
sentiment.
22But Elton, Gruber, and Busse (1998) and Doukas and Milonas (2004) have given strong
evidence against small investor sentiment (as measured by average discounts and premia) be-
ing a priced risk factor in asset markets. Consequently, I want to make clear that the volatility
found for the tails of the discount and premium distribution is independent of whatever it is
that causes discounts and premia across funds to be correlated (be it small investor sentiment
or something else.) Rejection of that common factor as a priced risk factor is a separate matter
from whether or not the volatility found in the tails of the discount and premium distribution
is itself priced.
Indeed, the results of Table 2 suggest that whatever it is that causes closed-end fund dis-
counts and premia to be correlated, there appears to be something else affecting the movement
of discounts and premia in the tails of the distribution. I suggest that this “something else”
is fund-speciﬁc noise-trader risk. As you move farther away from the center of the discount
and premium distribution, fund speciﬁc noise-trader risk increases, and as it does, funds in the
tails of the distribution are less and less likely to move with any overall change in sentiment
(or whatever it is that causes discount and premium levels near the center of the distribution
to be correlated.) This would explain why the R-squared statistics in Table 2 fall so quickly as
you move away from the center of the distribution.
Table 3 reports the results of using both the three Fama-French risk factors as well as
changes in the capital-weighted average discount level as independent variables for the twenty
arbitrage portfolios. As you can see, the cross-sectional pattern of excess returns is unchanged.
This is important because by adding DWt as an explanatory variable, we have accounted for
23movements in discounts and premia that are common to all funds.10 What remains, therefore,
must be portfolio speciﬁc.
Since modern ﬁnance theory rests on the idea that returns in excess of the risk-free rate
must be a compensation for risk, the cross-sectional pattern of excess returns found in Table 3
can only be explained by appealing to a missing risk factor. Since DWt will tend to account for
any noise-trader risk that is common to all funds, I conjecture that the missing risk factor must
be fund-speciﬁc noise-trader risk—the possibility that uninformed traders will drive a fund’s
share price further away from fundamentals than it already is.
Under this hypothesis, the observed excess returns are the compensation necessary to get
rational investors to invest in a speciﬁc fund and bear the fund-speciﬁc noise-trader risk that
its share price will move even farther away from fundamentals than it already has. The cross-
sectional pattern of excess returns is then explained by noise-trader risk increasing as you
move away from the center of the distribution in Figure 1. As noise-trader risk increases, so
must compensation. That is why excess returns increase in Table 3 for portfolios increasingly
far from the mean-reverting discount level.
But is it really proper to ascribe the increasing volatility of arbitrage portfolio returns as
you move away from the center of the distribution in Figure 1 to increasing levels of noise-
trader risk? The next subsection gives additional evidence in favor of this attribution by ex-
amining how trading volume and bid-ask spreads vary with discount and premium levels.
3.2.2. Spreads, Volume, and Noise-trader Risk
10I also experimented with using ﬁrst differences of the monthly standard deviation of discounts and premia
as well as ﬁrst differences of the average absolute discount or premium to see if there was any tendency for the
distribution to suddenly come together or expand—as if the rate of mean reversion sometimes sped up or slowed
down. These and other variables had no explanatory power whatsoever which is why I only report results on
DWt.
24Table 3
Regressions on Closed-end Fund Arbitrage Portfolios Deﬁned by Discount Levels
Including the Fama French Factors as well as a Factor to Account for Volatility Shared
by All Funds
This table reports the results of expanding the Fama-French regression results of Table 1 by adding changes in
the capital-weighted average discount across all funds as an additional explanatory variable. The notes to Table
1 explain the three Fama-French factors while the notes to Table 2 explain the capital-weighted average discount
series, Wt. Standard errors are calculated using the method of Newey and West (1987) and t-statistics are given
in parentheses. These are OLS regressions. All variables are deﬁned in percents.
Bin Bin Average Std. Dev.
Lower Upper Dependent Dependent
Bound Bound a rm ¡rf SMB HML DWt R-sq Variable Variable Obs.
-50 -45 -3.53 0.68 0.74 0.75 0.53 0.26 -3.93 8.41 16
(-1.21) (1.27) (0.57) (0.66) (0.24)
-45 -40 -5.19 0.58 -0.20 -0.05 1.08 0.13 -4.95 8.09 42
(-3.73) (1.41) (-0.35) (-0.1) (0.72)
-40 -35 -2.76 -0.13 0.26 0.38 -0.16 0.03 -2.74 8.97 44
(-2.10) (-0.48) (0.31) (0.78) (-0.15)
-35 -30 -4.17 -0.09 0.18 0.26 0.09 0.02 -4.06 8.08 65
(-3.92) (-0.37) (0.60) (0.70) (0.10)
-30 -25 -3.22 0.11 0.65 0.35 1.39 0.19 -3.18 7.78 76
(-2.94) (0.57) (1.79) (1.01) (1.53)
-25 -20 -1.63 0.34 0.11 0.02 1.18 0.08 -1.51 8.01 100
(-2.02) (1.71) (0.49) (0.09) (1.94)
-20 -15 -1.31 0.44 0.20 0.37 -0.11 0.11 -0.93 5.67 138
(-4.65) (2.21) (1.73) (1.94) (-0.14)
-15 -10 -1.07 0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.93 0.29 -1.10 2.53 170
(-5.73) (1.82) (-1.06) (0.14) (5.06)
-10 -5 -0.85 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.67 0.40 -0.82 1.89 177
(-6.27) (2.69) (0.28) (2.71) (6.74)
-5 0 -0.34 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.84 0.61 -0.39 1.60 178
(-4.51) (0.52) (1.02) (.00) (10.58)
0 5 -0.07 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.77 0.60 -0.08 1.52 178
(-0.88) (1.73) (0.57) (2.31) (9.58)
5 10 0.36 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.91 0.57 0.30 1.70 178
(3.91) (-0.16) (1.31) (0.65) (10.26)
10 15 0.75 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.75 0.34 0.74 1.97 174
(5.12) (0.82) (2.51) (1.53) (5.35)
15 20 0.91 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.88 0.25 0.93 2.65 164
(4.73) (1.29) (1.32) (0.18) (6.77)
20 25 1.83 0.16 0.02 0.08 0.45 0.09 1.98 3.54 147
(6.54) (1.53) 0.01 (1.17) (2.03)
25 30 2.12 0.44 0.01 0.09 0.86 0.15 2.60 5.92 99
(4.04) (2.41) (0.04) (0.90) (1.55)
30 35 2.64 0.47 -0.23 -0.05 1.08 0.14 3.47 7.18 56
(2.82) (2.74) (-1.05) (-0.38) (1.78)
35 40 1.30 0.86 0.32 0.37 0.17 0.43 1.56 4.72 23
(1.57) (4.54) (1.03) (1.48) (0.38)
40 45 8.17 0.90 -0.99 0.03 0.08 0.43 6.28 6.88 9
(2.00) (1.57) (-1.23) (0.12) (0.03)
45 50 Insufﬁcient Observations
25The cross-sectional pattern of excess returns found in Tables 1 and 3 suggests that a risk-
factor is not being properly accounted for. In this section, I give further evidence in favor of
the hypothesis that the risk factor in question is fund-speciﬁc noise-trader risk.
There are two pieces of evidence. The ﬁrst is the fact that if you plot closed-end fund
trading volume against discount and premium levels, you get a U-shaped curve centered on
the mean-reverting discount level of six percent. The second is that you also get a U-shaped
curve centered on the mean-reverting discount level when you plot bid-ask spreads against
discount and premium levels.
InFigure5, Iplottheratioofaveragemonthlytradingvolumetosharesoutstandingagainst
discount and premium levels. To construct the ﬁgure, I group monthly Fund Edge discount
and premium observations for all funds available from January 1985 to May 2001 into one-
percent wide discount and premium bins. For each fund in a given bin, I use CRSP data to
calculate the fund’s ratio of trading volume that month to total shares outstanding that month.
I then take the average for each bin and plot them in Figure 5.
As you can see, the average ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding has a very pro-
nounced U-shape. The U has its lowest point near the mean-reverting discount level and
increases substantially as you move away from the mean-reverting level in either direction.
For instance, whereas the average ratio of monthly trading volume to shares outstanding is
3.9% for the ﬁve-to-six percent discount bin, it is 8.8% for the 29% to 30% discount bin, and
9.5% for the -29% to -30% premium bin. Consequently, the ratio more than doubles as you
move from the center of the distribution in Figure 1 to either of the tails.
The observed increase is consistent with several theoretical models such as Varian (1989),
Kandel and Pearson (1995), and Harris and Raviv (1993) that link increased divergence of
opinion among traders with higher trading volumes. As funds move further away from fun-
26Figure 5. Average ratio of monthly trading volume to shares outstanding (expressed as a































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Figure 6. Average ratio of bid-ask spread to ask price (expressed as a percent) when sorting










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































, (ask¡bid)=ask for each observation. I then average all
the ratios in each bin and plot them in Figure 6.
28As you can see, there is a large increase in spreads as you move from the center of the
ﬁgure to the tails. At the mean reverting discount level, the average spread to ask ratio, (ask¡
bid)=ask, is 1.3%. For the 29% to 30% discount bin, it is 2.3%. For the -29% to -30%
premium bin it is 2.7%. These ﬁgures are, respectively, 77 percent larger and 108 percent
larger than the ratio at the mean-reverting discount level.
Such large differences are hard to reconcile with theories that ascribe the size of spreads
to informational asymmetries between market makers and other traders, as in as in the mod-
els of Kyle (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1992), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). As pointed
out by Neal and Wheatley (1995), the informational asymmetry story is simply not very con-
vincing for closed-end funds given the fact that market makers are as well informed about
fundamentals—fund NAVs—as any other market participants.
So something else must be causing market makers to widen their spreads as fund prices
move away from fundamental valuations. Fund-speciﬁc noise-trader risk is a reasonable ex-
planation since increasing price volatility by itself will cause risk-averse market makers to
widen spreads—even in the absence of informational differences—as in the models of Gar-
bade and Silber (1979) and Ho and Stoll (1981). My results also support Van Ness, Van Ness,
and Warr (2001), who conclude—after testing ﬁve theoretical models that incorporate asym-
metric information as an explanation for the size of spreads—that volatility itself (rather than
asymmetric information) is the major factor inﬂuencing the size of spreads.
To summarize, the U-shaped patterns of both volume and bid-ask spreads imply that there
are increasing levels of volatility and risk in closed-end fund markets the further you move
away from the mean-reverting discount level. Of particular interest is the widening of spreads.
Since these are determined by risk-averse human beings—the NYSE specialists who make
markets for the vast majority of the funds in the Fund Edge data set—they are the strongest
evidence that there is a form of risk that increases in magnitude the farther you move away
29from the mean-reverting discount level. I believe that the cross-sectional pattern of excess
returns observed in Tables 1 and 3 are the result of the market pricing this risk so that those
who choose to bear it receive due compensation.
4. Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of arbitrage and the returns to arbitrage in closed-end
funds. It concludes that the behavior of discounts and premia, arbitrage returns, fund trading
volume, and fund bid-ask spreads all argue in favor of a risk factor that increases in magnitude
the farther you move away from the center of the discount and premium distribution. This
paper argues that this risk factor is a form of noise-trader risk—the risk that fund mispricings
may widen rather than narrow due to the unpredictable trading activity of noise-traders.
The strongest evidence supporting this contention comes from an examination of the cross
section of closed-end fund arbitrage returns. Twenty portfolios are created to examine how
the returns to arbitrage vary by discount or premium level. When the returns to these twenty
arbitrage portfolios are regressed on the standard Fama-French factors, they produce a striking
pattern of excess returns. The excess returns are near zero for the portfolio closest to the center
of the discount and premium distribution, and then grow rapidly in magnitude as you move
away from the center of the distribution in either direction.
Since this pattern matches the growth in the volatility of arbitrage returns as you move
away from the center of the distribution, it suggests that the excess returns serve to compensate
investors for noise-trader risk that also increases as you move away from the center of the
distribution. If this risk were properly accounted for, the excess returns would disappear. But
because we have no variable capable of capturing the differing levels of noise-trader risk to
which the various portfolios are exposed, we get the observed pattern of excess returns.
30Additional evidence consistent with noise-trader risk increasing as you move away from
the center of the discount and premium distribution is provided by graphs showing, respec-
tively, how trading volume and bid-ask spreads vary with discount and premium levels. Both
are U-shaped. Their nadirs occur at the same discount level as the center of the discount
and premium distribution and both increase rapidly as you move away from the center of the
distribution.
Since higher volume is consistent with a larger diversity of trader opinions, the U-shaped
pattern for volume is consistent with the idea that noise-trader risk increases as you move
away from the mean-reverting discount level. The U-shaped pattern for spreads is even more
indicative of increasing noise-trader risk because spreads are set by risk-averse market makers.
Given that the markets for shares of closed-end funds offer no obvious informational asymme-
tries (since fund portfolio values are public), the best explanation for the widening of spreads
is that they are the self-protecting response of risk-averse market makers to increasing levels
of noise-trader induced volatility.
In conclusion, something is causing the cross-sectional pattern of excess returns found in
this paper. Further research should examine whether it is in fact due to noise-trader risk, or
whether some other more orthodox risk factor is responsible. If noise-trader risk is to blame,
then many new research avenues will be opened up to see whether the phenomena noted
in this paper are restricted to closed-end funds, or whether they affect other assets as well.
Of particular interest may be whether the observed rate of mean reversion for discounts and
premia is an equilibrium: Does mean reversion proceed just fast enough to generate a rate of
return just large enough to just compensate risk-averse arbitrageurs for the level of noise-trader
risk that they must bear when engaging in arbitrage? Or do they earn excess returns even after
accounting for noise-trader risk?
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